Weak and Strong Time Consistency in Differential Oligopoly Games with Capital Accumulation

Roberto Cellini and Luca Lambertini ()

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We illustrate two differential oligopoly games with capital accumulation where, alternatively, the accumulation dynamics of productive capacity is modelled either `a la Solow Swan or `a la Ramsey. We show that in the first case the open-loop Nash equilibrium is only weakly time consistent, while in the second it is strongly so, although the Ramsey game is not state linear.

Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Weak and Strong Time Consistency in a Differential Oligopoly Game with Capital Accumulation (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:544

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