EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Weak and Strong Time Consistency in a Differential Oligopoly Game with Capital Accumulation

Roberto Cellini and Luca Lambertini (luca.lambertini@unibo.it)

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2008, vol. 138, issue 1, No 2, 17-26

Abstract: Abstract We illustrate a differential oligopoly game with capital accumulation where the accumulation dynamics of productive capacity is modelled à la Ramsey. The model is solved under the open-loop information structure, to show that it admits an open-loop Nash equilibrium which is indeed a degenerate feedback one and therefore strongly time consistent, even if, by construction, the problem under consideration is not a linear state game.

Keywords: Differential games; Capital accumulation; Open-loop equilibria; Feedback equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10957-008-9432-0 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: Weak and Strong Time Consistency in Differential Oligopoly Games with Capital Accumulation (2005) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joptap:v:138:y:2008:i:1:d:10.1007_s10957-008-9432-0

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... cs/journal/10957/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10957-008-9432-0

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications is currently edited by Franco Giannessi and David G. Hull

More articles in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla (sonal.shukla@springer.com) and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (indexing@springernature.com).

 
Page updated 2024-12-28
Handle: RePEc:spr:joptap:v:138:y:2008:i:1:d:10.1007_s10957-008-9432-0