Defensive Weapons and Star Wars: A Supergame with Optimal Punishments

G. Giacomello and Luca Lambertini (luca.lambertini@unibo.it)

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We model the perspective faced by nuclear powers involved in a supergame where nuclear deterrence is used to stabilise peace. This setting allows us to investigate the bearings of defensive weapons on the effectiveness of deterrence and peace stability, relying on one-shot optimal punishments. We find that the sustainability of peace is unaffected by defensive shields if both countries have them, while a unilateral endowment of such weapons has destabilising consequences.

JEL-codes: C73 F51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Journal Article: Defensive weapons and star wars: a supergame with optimal punishments (2016)
Working Paper: Defensive Weapons and Star Wars: A Supergame with Optimal Punishments (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp739

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