Defensive Weapons and Star Wars: A Supergame with Optimal Punishments

Giampiero Giacomello () and Luca Lambertini ()
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Giampiero Giacomello: Department of Political and Social Studies, University of Bologna, Italy

Working Paper series from Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis

Abstract: We model the perspective faced by nuclear powers involved in a supergame where nuclear deterrence is used to stabilise peace. This setting allows us to investigate the bearings of defensive weapons on the effectiveness of deterrence and peace stability, relying on one-shot optimal punishments. We find that the sustainability of peace is unaffected by defensive shields if both countries have them, while asymmetric endowments of such weapons have clearcut destabilising consequences.

Keywords: defensive shields; deterrence; wargames (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 F51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Working Paper: Defensive Weapons and Star Wars: A Supergame with Optimal Punishments (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rim:rimwps:57_13

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