Temporary Workers Are Not Free-Riders: An Experimental Investigation

Davide Dragone, Fabio Galeotti and R. Orsini

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We conduct an artefactual field experiment to study whether the individual preferences and propensity to cooperate of temporary workers differ from permanent contract workers. We find that temporary and permanent contract workers have different other-regarding preferences, but display similar contribution patterns in an anonymous Public Good Game. Students, instead, are more selfish and contribute less than temporary and permanent workers.

JEL-codes: C72 C93 D23 H41 J54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hrm and nep-lab
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp915

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