CSR in an Asymmetric Duopoly with Environmental Externalities

Luca Lambertini (), Arsen Palestini () and Alessandro Tampieri

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We investigate a linear state dfferential game describing an asymmetric Cournot duopoly with capacity accumulation la Ramsey and a negative environmental externality (pollution), in which one of the firms has adopted corporate social responsibility (CSR) in its statute, and therefore includes consumer surplus and the environmental effects of production in its objective function. If the market is sufficiently large, the CSR firm sells more, accumulates more capital and earns higher profits than its profit-seeking rival.

JEL-codes: C73 H23 L13 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-ene, nep-env and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://amsacta.unibo.it/4067/1/WP959.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: CSR in an Asymmetric Duopoly with Environmental Externalities (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp959

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna ().