CSR in an Asymmetric Duopoly with Environmental Externalities

Luca Lambertini (), Arsen Palestini () and Alessandro Tampieri

DEM Discussion Paper Series from Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg

Abstract: We investigate a linear state differential game describing an asymmetric Cournot duo- poly with capacity accumulation à la Ramsey and a negative environmental externality (pollution), in which one of the firms has adopted corporate social responsibility (CSR) in its statute, and therefore includes consumer surplus and the environmental effects of production in its objective function. If the market is sufficiently large, the CSR firm sells more, accumulates more capital and earns higher profits than its profit-seeking rival.

Keywords: Capital accumulation; asymmetric duopoly; dynamic games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 H23 L13 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-ene, nep-env, nep-gth and nep-res
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Working Paper: CSR in an Asymmetric Duopoly with Environmental Externalities (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:luc:wpaper:14-19

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