Eliciting Moral Preferences Under Image Concerns: Theory and Evidence

Roland Benabou, Armin Falk, Luca Henkel and Jean Tirole

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: We analyze how the impact of image motives on behavior varies with two key features of the choice mechanism: single versus multiple decisions, and certainty versus uncertainty of consequences. Using direct elicitation (DE) versus multiple-price-list (MPL) or equivalently Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) schemes as exemplars, we characterize how image-seeking inflates prosocial giving. The signaling bias (relative to true preferences) is shown to depend on the interaction between elicitation method and visibility level: it is greater under DE for low image concerns, and greater under MPL/BDM for high ones. We experimentally test the model’s predictions and find the predicted crossing effect.

Keywords: Moral behavior; deontology; utilitarianism; consequentialism; social image; self-image; norms; preference elicitation; multiple price list; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D01 D62 D64 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 55
Date: 2023-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-soc and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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