Menu-Dependent Self-Control

Jawwad Noor

No WP2006-021, Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics

Abstract: The literature on self-control problems has typically put forth models that imply behavior that is consistent with the Weak Axiom of Revealed Prefer- ence. Thus, while choice is hypothesized to be the outcome of some under- lying internal con.ict, the resulting choices are perfectly consistent across choice problems. We argue that such consistency is not to be expected from agents who suffer from self-control problems because an agent's ability to resist temptation may well depend on what alternatives are available to him. That is, self-control may be menu-dependent. This paper generalizes Gul and Pesendorfer [9] in a way that permits abstract menu-dependent self-control. Various specializations are considered. The foundations of the model require weakening Gul and Pesendorfer [9]'s Independence and Set-Betweenness ax- ioms.

Keywords: Menu-Dependence; Self-Control; Temptation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2006-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Menu-dependent self-control (2015)
Working Paper: Menu-Dependent Self-Control (2011)
Working Paper: Menu-Dependent Self-Control (2006)
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