Menu-Dependent Self-Control

Jawwad Noor and Norio Takeoka ()
Additional contact information
Norio Takeoka: Department of Economics, Yokohama National University,

No WP2011-041, Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics

Abstract: The literature on self-control problems has typically put forth models that imply behavior that is consistent with the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference. We argue that when choice is the outcome of some underlying internal conflict, the resulting choices may not be perfectly consistent across choice problems: an agent’s ability to resist temptation may well depend on what alternatives are available to him. We generalize Gul and Pesendorfer [18] so that self-control weakens in the presence of temptation. The foundations of the models require weakening the Independence axiom. The model is shown to unify a range of well-known findings in the experimental literature on choice under risk and over time.

Pages: 56 pages
Date: 2011-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Menu-dependent self-control (2015)
Working Paper: Menu-Dependent Self-Control (2006)
Working Paper: Menu-Dependent Self-Control (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2011-041

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Program Coordinator ().