The dynamics of leniency application and the knock-on effect of cartel enforcement
Working Papers from Bruegel
Highlights The authors study the timing of leniency applications using a novel application of multi-spell discrete-time survival analysis for a sample of cartels prosecuted by the European Commission between 1996 and 2014. The start of a Commission investigation does not affect the rate by which conspirators apply for leniency in the market investigated, but increases the rate of application in separate markets in which a conspirator in the investigated market...
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bre:wpaper:13042
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