Organizational Design, Technology and the Boundaries of the Firm

Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka

Bristol Economics Discussion Papers from School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK

Abstract: Focus - specialization and specific technology - improves productivity but leads to more dependency and opens a door for power problems. We analyze how organizational design and the choice of technology interact with the allocation of ownership in minimizing the holdup problem in the property rights theory of Grossman-Hart-Moore. We find a novel motive for job rotation: rotation reduces holdup problems in an integrated firm. We also show that holdup problem in specific physical capital is removed in the integrated firm while holdups in specific human capital remain.

Keywords: boundaries of firm; organizational Design; technology; property rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2002-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Organizational Design, Technology and the Boundaries of the Firm (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bri:uobdis:02/540

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