Common Ownership of Public Goods
Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka () and
Bristol Economics Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK
We analyze optimal ownership of public goods in a repeated game focusing on common ownership. Under common ownership an owner’s access to the public good cannot be restricted by other owners. We find that under common ownership both the value of the relationship and the gain from deviation are high. Common ownership is optimal when the marginal return to maintenance investments is low consistent with the stylized facts.
Keywords: public goods; common pool resources; property rights; repeated games; common ownership; joint ownership. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 H41 L14 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bri:uobdis:18/700
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