Common ownership of public goods

Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka and Evagelos Pafilis

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2020, vol. 180, issue C, 555-578

Abstract: We analyze ownership of public goods in a repeated game focusing on common ownership. Under common ownership an owner’s access to the public good cannot be restricted by other owners. We find that under common ownership both the value of the relationship and the gain from deviation are high. Common ownership can provide the best incentives for cooperation when the value of the public good cannot be increased much by maintenance investments or the maintenance costs are sufficiently convex. We argue that these conditions are satisfied in Ostrom’s field studies of irrigation systems and common lands.

Keywords: Public goods; Common pool resources; Property rights theory; Relational contracts; Common ownership; Joint ownership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 H41 L14 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Common Ownership of Public Goods (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:180:y:2020:i:c:p:555-578

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.10.002

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