Active decisions and pro-social behavior: a field experiment on blood donation

Alois Stutzer, Lorenz Götte and Michael Zehnder ()
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Michael Zehnder: University of Basel

Working papers from Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel

Abstract: In this paper, we propose a decision framework where people are individually asked to either actively consent or dissent to some pro-social behavior. We hypothesize that confronting individuals with the choice of engaging in a specific pro-social behavior contributes to the formation of issue-specific altruistic preferences while simultaneously involving a commitment. The hypothesis is tested in a large-scale field experiment on blooddonation. We find that this "active-decision" intervention substantially increases the actual donation behavior of people who have not fully formed references beforehand.

Keywords: active decision; pro-social behavior; field experiment; blood donation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D64 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://edoc.unibas.ch/26564/1/06_04.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Active Decisions and Prosocial Behaviour: a Field Experiment on Blood Donation (2011)
Working Paper: Active decisions and pro-social behavior: A field experiment on blood donation (2006)
Working Paper: Active Decisions and Pro-social Behavior: A Field Experiment on Blood Donation (2006)
Working Paper: Active Decisions and Pro-social Behavior: A Field Experiment on Blood Donation (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2006/04

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