Incentive Aspects of Revenue Sharing: Central and Regional Government in Russia

Alexander Plekhanov

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: The paper provides an empirical analysis of fiscal incentives for Russian regional governments to foster economic growth and development. It points out several serious problems with previous empirical studies of fiscal incentives into Russian federalism, develops a new theoretical framework for the analysis of revenue-sharing policy between central and regional governments, paying particular attention to the case of non-benevolent authorities, and provides new estimates of incentive effects using an improved econometric methodology and a newly-collected dataset. Contrary to existing studies, incentives for regional governments are estimated to be present, but these incentive effects are considerably weaker in the short run than in the long run.

Keywords: Fiscal federalism; incentives; Russia; regional government (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H3 H7 O52 P35 R5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28
Date: 2004-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-cis, nep-geo and nep-pbe
Note: PE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:0440

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