On Asymmetric Behaviors if Voting is Costly

Francesco De Sinopoli and Giovanna Iannantuoni ()

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: Most of the voting models restrict themselves to the analysis of symmetric equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which ‘similar’ voters make ‘similar’ voting decisions. In this paper we investigate this assumption under costly plurality voting. In any pure strategy equilibrium, if two active voters have the same preference order over candidates, they do vote for the same candidate. However, as an example shows, this type of result cannot be hoped for mixed strategies equilibria.

Keywords: Strategic Voting; Symmetric Equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14
Date: 2005-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dcm, nep-gth and nep-pol
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Working Paper: On asymmetric behaviors if voting is costly (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:0521

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