On asymmetric behaviors if voting is costly

Francesco De Sinopoli
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Giovanna Iannantuoni ()

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: Most of the voting models restrict themselves to the analysis of symmetric equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which "similar" voters make "similar" voting decisions. In this paper we investigate this assumption under costly plurality voting. In any pure strategy equilibrium, if two active voters have the same preference order over candidates, they do vote for the same candidate. However, as an example shows, this type of result cannot be hoped for mixed strategies equilibria.

Date: 2005-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm and nep-pol
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Working Paper: On Asymmetric Behaviors if Voting is Costly (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we053320

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