Efficiencies Defences for Mergers within a Dominant Group

Lin Bian and Donald McFetridge
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Lin Bian: Department of Economics, Carleton University, http://www.carleton.ca/economics/

No 00-09, Carleton Economic Papers from Carleton University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Antitrust enforcement in a number of countries allows an efficiencies defence for horizontal mergers, joint ventures, specialization agreements and other horizontal arrangements. These defences may be statutory, jurisprudential or administrative. They involve, in essence, a balancing of real per unit cost savings (improvements in technical efficiency) resulting from a merger or agreement against its anticompetitive effects.

Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2000-06
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Published: Carleton Economic Papers

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