Estimating the Budgetary Cost of U.S. Commitments to the International Monetary Fund: Working Paper 2026-02

Michael Falkenheim and Youstiena Shafeek

No 61550, Working Papers from Congressional Budget Office

Abstract: Using a fair-value approach, the Congressional Budget Office estimates the cost of increasing the United States' financial commitment to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Although countries default much less often on the IMF than on other lenders, the fund still carries credit risk. By design, the IMF lends to countries experiencing significant macroeconomic challenges. Private markets often avoid those borrowers. Even when borrowing countries eventually repay loans that fall into arrears, the IMF still experiences a financial burden. The fund passes some costs of

JEL-codes: F33 F34 H81 H83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-02-27
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