Sharing a Risky Cake

David Baqaee

Working Papers in Economics from University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance

Abstract: Consider an n-person Nash Bargaining problem where players bargain over the division of a cake whose size is stochastic. In such a game, the players are not only bargaining for more cake, but they are also sharing risk. This paper examines and provides the solution to this problem and highlights a few special cases.

Keywords: Risk sharing; uncertainty; Nash bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2009-12-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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https://repec.canterbury.ac.nz/cbt/econwp/0920.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Sharing a risky cake (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cbt:econwp:09/20

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