Sharing a risky cake

David Baqaee and Richard Watt ()

No DP2010/06, Reserve Bank of New Zealand Discussion Paper Series from Reserve Bank of New Zealand

Abstract: Consider an n-person bargaining problem where players bargain over the division of a cake whose size is stochastic. In such a game, the players are not only bargaining over the division of a cake, but they are also sharing risk. This paper presents the Nash bargaining solution to this problem, investigates its properties, and highlights a few special cases.

JEL-codes: C23 D10 R20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 p.
Date: 2010-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Related works:
Working Paper: Sharing a Risky Cake (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nzb:nzbdps:2010/06

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