Efficiency in Decentralized Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty

Braz Camargo (), Dino Gerardi and Lucas Maestri

No 453, Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto

Abstract: We study efficiency in decentralized markets with aggregate uncertainty and one-sided private information. There is a continuum of mass one of uninformed buyers and a continuum of mass one of informed sellers. Buyers and sellers are randomly and anonymously matched in pairs over time, and buyers make the offers. We show that all equilibria become efficient as trading frictions vanish.

JEL-codes: C70 C78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: pages 14
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Efficiency in Decentralised Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty (2020)
Working Paper: Efficiency in Decentralized Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cca:wpaper:453

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