Efficiency in Decentralised Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty

Braz Camargo (), Dino Gerardi and Lucas Maestri

The Economic Journal, 2020, vol. 130, issue 626, 446-461

Abstract: We study efficiency in non-stationary decentralised markets with common-value uncertainty and correlated asset values. There is an equal mass of buyers and sellers and payoffs from trade depend on an aggregate state, which only the sellers know. Buyers and sellers are randomly and anonymously matched in pairs over time, and buyers make the offers. We show that all equilibria become efficient as trading frictions vanish.

Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ej/uez053 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Efficiency in Decentralized Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty (2016)
Working Paper: Efficiency in Decentralized Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:econjl:v:130:y:2020:i:626:p:446-461.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

The Economic Journal is currently edited by Francesco Lippi

More articles in The Economic Journal from Royal Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press () and ().