ASSESSING THE TRUTH AXIOM UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

Giacomo Bonanno () and Klaus Nehring
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Klaus Nehring: Department of Economics, University of California Davis

No 116, Working Papers from University of California, Davis, Department of Economics

Abstract: Within an incomplete information framework (where the primitives are the individuals'' belief hierarchies) we investigate the intersubjective implications of the assumption that it is common belief that no individual has any false beliefs (a key component of the Truth Axiom). We consider two types of intersubjective conditions: (1) qualitative agreement and unbounded gains from betting, and (2) a notion of intersubjective caution. The entire analysis is carried out locally.

Date: 2003-01-07
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Related works:
Journal Article: Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information (1998)
Working Paper: ASSESSING THE TRUTH AXIOM UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
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