ASSESSING THE TRUTH AXIOM UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

Giacomo Bonanno () and Klaus Nehring

Department of Economics from California Davis - Department of Economics

Abstract: Within an incomplete information framework (where the primitives are the individuals' belief hierarchies) we investigate the intersubjective implications of the assumption that it is common belief that no individual has any false beliefs (a key component of the Truth Axiom). We consider two types of intersubjective conditions: (1) qualitative agreement and unbounded gains from betting, and (2) a notion of intersubjective caution. The entire analysis is carried out locally.

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Related works:
Working Paper: ASSESSING THE TRUTH AXIOM UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION (2003)
Journal Article: Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:caldec:97-03

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