RECENT RESULTS ON BELIEF, KNOWLEDGE AND THE EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF GAME THEORY

Giacomo Bonanno () and Pierpaolo Battigalli ()

No 266, Working Papers from University of California, Davis, Department of Economics

Abstract: We provide a self-contained, selective overview of the literature on the role of knowledge and beliefs in game theory. We focus on recent results on the epistemic foundations of solution concepts, including correlated equilibrium, rationalizability in dynamic games, forward and backward induction.

Pages: 94
Date: 2003-01-08
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Related works:
Journal Article: Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory (1999)
Working Paper: RECENT RESULTS ON BELIEF, KNOWLEDGE AND THE EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF GAME THEORY
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cda:wpaper:266

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