EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Pure Saddle Points and Symmetric Relative Payoff Games

Burkhard Schipper (), Peter Duersch and Jörg Oechssler
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Peter Dürsch

No 301, Working Papers from University of California, Davis, Department of Economics

Abstract: It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors game. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. We apply our theory to a rich collection of examples by noting that the class of symmetric two-player zero-sum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric two-player games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of a finite population evolutionary stable strategies.

Keywords: symmetric two-player games; zero-sum games; Rock-Paper-Scissors; single-peakedness; quasiconcavity; finite population evolutionary stable strategy; increasing differences; decreasing differences; potentials; additive separability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-02-20
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/74e8Ar3RjaDus7W5Tbe8tMWx/10-4.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Pure Saddle Points and Symmetric Relative Payoff Games (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: Pure Saddle Points and Symmetric Relative Payoff Games (2010) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cda:wpaper:301

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of California, Davis, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by DSS IT Service Center ().

 
Page updated 2019-10-12
Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:301