Granny versus Game Theorist: Ambiguity in Experimental Games

Burkhard Schipper, David Kelsey and Juergen Eichberger
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Juergen Eichberger: Department of Economics, University of California Davis

No 82, Working Papers from University of California, Davis, Department of Economics

Abstract: We report on an experiment in which subjects choose actions in strategic games with either strategic complements or substitutes against a granny, a game theorist or other subjects. The games are selected in order to test predictions on the comparative statics of equilibrium with respect to changes in strategic ambiguity. We find that subjects face higher ambiguity while playing against the granny than playing against the game theorist if we assume that subjects are ambiguity averse. Moreover, under the same assumption, subjects choose more secure actions in games more prone to ambiguity which is in line with the predictions.

Keywords: Knightian uncertainty; Choquet expected utility; equilibrium under ambiguity; strategic uncertainty; experiments. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 C90 C91 D80 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27
Date: 2006-09-25
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Granny Versus Game Theorist: Ambiguity in Experimental Games (2008)
Working Paper: Granny versus Game Theorst: Ambiguity in Experimental Games (2006)
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