Incentives for Subjects in Internet Experiments

Burkhard Schipper and Jörg Oechssler

No 99, Working Papers from University of California, Davis, Department of Economics

Abstract: Internet experiments are a new and convenient way for reaching a large subject pool. Yet, providing incentives to subjects can be a tricky design issue. One cost effective and simple method is the publication of a high score (as in computer games). We test whether a high score provides adequate and non-distortionary incentives by comparing it to the usual performance based incentives. We find significant differences and conclude that high scores are not always appropriate as an incentive device. Performance based financial incentives seem to be required also in internet experiments.

Keywords: incentives; internet; experiments; high score; incentives; internet; experiments; high score (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15
Date: 2008-02-20
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/3uLPTPp48RburEQU9XLfJ5zx/08-1.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Incentives for subjects in internet experiments (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cda:wpaper:99

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of California, Davis, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Letters and Science IT Services Unit ().