Repeated Implementation with Overlapping Generations of Agents
Helmuts Azacis ()
No E2017/16, Cardiff Economics Working Papers from Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section
We study repeated implementation in a model with overlapping generations of agents. A social choice function selects an alternative in each period as a function of preferences of the agents who are alive in that period. When the agents' preferences do not change during their lifetime, we show that any social choice function satisfying a mild unanimity condition is repeatedly implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium if there are at least three agents and they live sufficiently long. When the agents' preferences change every period, we show that only efficient social choice functions can be repeatedly implementable if the agents live sufficiently long.
Keywords: Repeated Implementation; Subgame Perfect Implementa- tion; Overlapping Generations; Necessary and Sufficient Conditions; Efficiency in the Range (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2017/16
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