Repeated implementation with overlapping generations of agents

Helmuts Azacis

Social Choice and Welfare, 2020, vol. 55, issue 2, No 5, 275-299

Abstract: Abstract We study repeated implementation in a model with overlapping generations of agents. A social choice function selects an alternative in each period as a function of preferences of those agents who are alive in that period. When the agents’ preferences do not change during their lifetime, we show that any social choice function satisfying a mild unanimity condition is repeatedly implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium if there are at least three agents and they live sufficiently long. When the agents’ preferences change every period, we show that only efficient social choice functions can be repeatedly implementable if the agents live sufficiently long.

Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-020-01240-8 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: Repeated Implementation with Overlapping Generations of Agents (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:55:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-020-01240-8

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-020-01240-8

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().