Do we need to listen to all stakeholders?: communicating in a coordination game with private information
Antonio Cabrales (),
Michalis Drouvelis (),
Zeynep Gürgüç and
Indrajit Ray ()
No E2018/23, Cardiff Economics Working Papers from Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section
We consider an experiment with a version of the Battle of the Sexes game with two-sided private information, preceded by a round of either one-way or two-way cheap talk. We compare different treatments to study truthful revelation of information and subsequent payoffs from the game. We find that the players are overall truthful about their types in the cheap-talk phase in both one-way and two-way talk. Furthermore, the unique symmetric cheap-talk equilibrium in the two-way cheap talk game is played when the players fully reveal their information; however, they achieve higher payoffs in the game when the talk is one-way as the truthful reports facilitate desired coordination.
Keywords: Battle of the Sexes; Private Information; Cheap talk; Coordination. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2018/23
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