International Environmental Agreements with Mixed Strategies and Investment

Fuhai Hong and Larry Karp

Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series from Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley

Abstract: We modify a canonical participation game used to study International Environmental Agreements (IEA), considering both mixed and pure strategies at the participation stage, and including a prior cost-reducing investment stage. The use of mixed strategies at the participation stage reverses a familiar result and alsoreverses the policy implication of that result: with mixed strategies, equilibriumparticipation and welfare is higher in equilibria that involve higher investment.

Keywords: Life Sciences; Social and Behavioral Sciences; International Environmental Agreement; climate agreement; participation games; investment; mixed strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-05-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-gth
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (43)

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Related works:
Journal Article: International Environmental Agreements with mixed strategies and investment (2012)
Working Paper: International environmental agreements with mixed strategies and investment (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt0xf976x1

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