International environmental agreements with mixed strategies and investment

Fuhsai Hong and Larry Karp

No 123719, CUDARE Working Papers from University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics

Abstract: We modify a canonical participation game used to study International Environmental Agreements (IEA), considering both mixed and pure strategies at the participation stage, and including a prior cost-reducing investment stage. The use of mixed strategies at the participation stage reverses a familiar result and also reverses the policy implication of that result: with mixed strategies, equilibrium participation and welfare is higher in equilibria that involve higher investment.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35
Date: 2012-05-08
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (37)

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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/123719/files/Karp%20CUDARE%201129.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: International Environmental Agreements with mixed strategies and investment (2012)
Working Paper: International Environmental Agreements with Mixed Strategies and Investment (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ucbecw:123719

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.123719

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