Dynamics and Limited Cooperation In International Environmental Agreements

Larry Karp and Sandeep Sacheti

Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series from Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley

Abstract: The amount of cooperation needed to improve the welfare of signatories of International Environmental Agreements (lEAs), in the presence of market imperfections, depends on the characteristics of pollution. In a dynamic model, the conventional wisdom on the effect of free-riding needs to be modified for certain types of pollution problems. For local pollution problems, a sufficient level of free-riding actually promotes signatories' welfare. For global pollution problems, the conventional wisdom is correct insofar as free-riding makes it more difficult to form a successful lEA. However, for some global pollution problems, free-tiding may disappear. A static model may overstate or understate the difficulty of forming a successful lEA. The effect of an lEA is sensitive to differences between the duration of the lEA and agents' planning horizon.

Keywords: International Environmental Agreements; environmental stocks; dynamics; free-riding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-07-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/4sb827mk.pdf;origin=repeccitec (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Dynamics and Limited Cooperation In International Environmental Agreements (1997)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt4sb827mk

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series from Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lisa Schiff ().