Dynamics and Limited Cooperation In International Environmental Agreements

Larry Karp and Sandeep Sacheti

No 6212, CUDARE Working Papers from University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics

Abstract: The amount of cooperation needed to improve the welfare of signatories of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs), in the presence of market imperfections, depends on the characteristics of pollution. In a dynamic model, the conventional wisdom on the effect of free-riding needs to be modified for certain types of pollution problems. For local pollution problems, a sufficient level of free-riding actually promotes signatories' welfare. For global pollution problems, the conventional wisdom is correct insofar as free-riding makes it more difficult to form a successful IEA. However, for some global pollution problems, free-riding may disappear. A static model may overstate or understate the difficulty of forming a successful IEA. The effect of an IEA is sensitive to differences between the duration of the IEA and agents' planning horizon.

Keywords: Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34
Date: 1997
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Working Paper: Dynamics and Limited Cooperation In International Environmental Agreements (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ucbecw:6212

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.6212

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