Risk Aversion in a Dynamic Trading Game

Larry Karp

Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series from Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley

Abstract: The effect of risk aversion on Nash equilibrium trade restrictions is studied using numerical methods. An increase in a nation's level of risk aversion can lead to either an increase or decrease in its equilibrium restriction and either an increase or decrease in its rival's restriction. The linear quadratic dynamic game is generalized to include risk aversion.

Keywords: future trading; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1986-01-01
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Working Paper: Risk Aversion in a Dynamic Trading Game (1986)
Working Paper: Risk aversion in a dynamic trading game (1986)
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