Risk aversion in a dynamic trading game

Larry Karp

No 6096, CUDARE Working Papers from University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics

Abstract: The effect of risk aversion on Nash equilibrium trade restrictions is studied using numerical methods. An increase in a nation's level of risk aversion can lead to either an increase or decrease in its equilibrium restriction and either an increase or decrease in its rival's restriction. The linear quadratic dynamic game is generalized to include risk aversion.

Keywords: International Relations/Trade; Research Methods/Statistical Methods; Risk and Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25
Date: 1986
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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/6096/files/wp860404.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Risk Aversion in a Dynamic Trading Game (1986)
Working Paper: Risk Aversion in a Dynamic Trading Game (1986)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ucbecw:6096

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.6096

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