Special Interests Versus the Public Interest: The Determination of Policy Instruments

Gordon Rausser and Gérard Roland

Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series from Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley

Abstract: This paper focuses on recent theoretical developments in political economy and what role they might play in explaining and reforming individual country and global distortions in food and agriculture. Four groups of forces are isolated: political governance structures emphasizing the role of democratic mechanisms; the design of polycentric structures for assigned governmental authority for setting policy instruments; market structure and other socioeconomic characteristics; and the role of sector mobility and asset diversification. Each of these forces are distilled and data sources are reviewed that will allow econometric specifications that have both explanatory and policy reform implications.

Keywords: public policy; public economics; politics and government; market structures; sector mobility; Social and Behavioral Sciences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-06-11
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Working Paper: Special Interests Versus the Public Interest: The Determination of Policy Instruments (2008)
Working Paper: Special Interests Versus the Public Interest: The Determination of Policy Instruments (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt9x85q919

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