Special Interests Versus the Public Interest: The Determination of Policy Instruments

Gordon Rausser and Gérard Roland

No 37533, CUDARE Working Papers from University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics

Abstract: This paper focuses on recent theoretical developments in political economy and what role they might play in explaining and reforming individual country and global distortions in food and agriculture. Four groups of forces are isolated: political governance structures emphasizing the role of democratic mechanisms; the design of polycentric structures for assigned governmental authority for setting policy instruments; market structure and other socioeconomic characteristics; and the role of sector mobility and asset diversification. Each of these forces are distilled and data sources are reviewed that will allow econometric specifications that have both explanatory and policy reform implications.

Keywords: Agricultural and Food Policy; Production Economics; Public Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38
Date: 2008-06
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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/37533/files/CUDARE%201057%20Raussera.pdf (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Special Interests Versus the Public Interest: The Determination of Policy Instruments (2008)
Working Paper: Special Interests Versus the Public Interest: The Determination of Policy Instruments (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ucbecw:37533

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.37533

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