EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Clock Games: Theory and Experiments

Markus Brunnermeier () and John Morgan

Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series from Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Abstract: Timing is crucial in situations ranging from product introductions, to currency attacks, to starting a revolution. These settings share the feature that payoffs depend critically on the timing of moves of a few other key players—and these are uncertain. To capture this, we introduce the notion of clock games and experimentally test them. Each player’s clock starts on receiving a signal about a payoff-relevant state variable. Since the timing of the signals is random, clocks are de-synchronized. A player must decide how long, if at all, to delay his move after receiving the signal. We show that (i) equilibrium is always characterized by strategic delay—regardless of whether moves are observable or not; (ii) delay decreases as clocks become more synchronized and increases as information becomes more concentrated; (iii) When moves are observable, players “herd” immediately after any player makes a move. We then show, in a series of experiments, that key predictions of the model are consistent with observed behavior.

Keywords: Clock games; experiments; currency attacks; bubbles; political revolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-10-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/9c11m09n.pdf;origin=repeccitec (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Clock games: Theory and experiments (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: Clock Games: Theory and Experiments (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: Clock Games: Theory and Experiments (2004) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:compol:qt9c11m09n

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series from Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lisa Schiff ().

 
Page updated 2022-09-14
Handle: RePEc:cdl:compol:qt9c11m09n