Antitrust

Louis Kaplow and Carl Shapiro

Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series from Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Abstract: This is a survey of the economic principles that underlie antitrust law and how those principles relate to competition policy. We address four core subject areas: market power, collusion, mergers between competitors, and monopolization. In each area, we select the most relevant portions of current economic knowledge and use that knowledge to critically assess central features of antitrust policy. Our objective is to foster the improvement of legal regimes and also to identify topics where further analytical and empirical exploration would be useful. This is a survey of the economic principles that underlie antitrust law and how those principles relate to competition policy. We address four core subject areas: market power, collusion, mergers between competitors, and monopolization. In each area, we select the most relevant portions of current economic knowledge and use that knowledge to critically assess central features of antitrust policy. Our objective is to foster the improvement of legal regimes and also to identify topics where further analytical and empirical exploration would be useful.

Keywords: antitrust; competition policy; monopoly; market power; market definition; oligopoly; collusion; cartels; price fixing; facilitating practices; mergers; horizontal mergers; unilateral effects; monopolization; exclusionary practices; predatory pricing; exclusive dealing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-01-16
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Chapter: Antitrust (2007)
Working Paper: Antitrust (2007)
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