Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency

Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael Katz ()

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Keywords: agency; renegotiation; verifiability; Social and Behavioral Sciences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1990-05-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency (1991)
Working Paper: Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency (1990)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt1678w3w9

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