Rivalrous Benefit Taxation: The Independent Viability of Separate Agencies or Firms

Aaron S. Edlin and Mario Epelbaum

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Keywords: increasing returns; nonlinear pricing; substitutes; general equilibrium; Social and Behavioral Sciences; Business (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993-12-01
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