Tournaments, Termination Schemes, and Forcing Contracts

Sudipto Bhattacharya

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Keywords: tournament incentive schemes; payoff structures; asymptotic first-best optimal resolutions; Social and Behavioral Sciences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1985-06-01
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