Heterogeneity in Organizational Form: Why Otherwise Identical Firms Choose Different Incentives for Their Managers

Benjamin Hermalin

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Keywords: Principal-agent theory; industrial organization; Business; Social and Behavioral Sciences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1992-05-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/4v4548gz.pdf;origin=repeccitec (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Heterogeneity in Organizational Form: Why Otherwise Identical Firms Choose Different Incentives for Their Managers (1994)
Working Paper: Heterogeneity in Organizational Form: Why Otherwise Identical Firms Choose Different Incentives for Their Managers (1992)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt4v4548gz

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lisa Schiff ().