The Use of an Agent in a Signaling Model

Bernard Caillaud () and Benjamin Hermalin

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Keywords: Signaling models and principal-agent problems; Social and Behavioral Sciences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991-09-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/5481b61w.pdf;origin=repeccitec (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Use of an Agent in a Signalling Model (1993)
Working Paper: Use of an agent in a signalling model (the) (1991)
Working Paper: The Use of an Agent in a Signalling Model (1991)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt5481b61w

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lisa Schiff ().