Moral Hazard and Verifiability

Benjamin Hermalin and Michael Katz ()

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Keywords: principal-agent; observability; verifiability; renegotiation; Social and Behavioral Sciences; Law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1989-10-01
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