Procrastination on Long-Term Projects

Ted O'Donoghue and Matthew Rabin

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Abstract: Previous papers on time-inconsistent procrastination assume projects are completed once begun. We develop a model in which a person chooses whether and when to complete each stage of a long-term project. In addition to procrastination in starting a project, a naive person might undertake costly effort to begin a project but then never complete it. When the costs of completing different stages are more unequal, procrastination is more likely, and it is when later stages are more costly that people start but don't finish projects. Moreover, if the structure of costs over the course of a project is endogenous, people are prone to choose cost structures that lead them to start but not finish projects. We also consider several extensions of the model that further illustrate how people may incur costs on projects they never complete.

Keywords: Hyperbolic Discounting; Naivete; Partial Naivete; Present-Biased Preferences; Self Control; Sophistication; Time Inconsistency; economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01-23
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https://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/5zb60651.pdf;origin=repeccitec (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Procrastination on long-term projects (2008)
Working Paper: Procrastination on Long-Term Projects (2003)
Working Paper: Procrastination on Long-Term Projects (2002)
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